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ABSTRACT 
The term "metachemistry" was introduced by Gaston Bachelard and served primarily to identify the 
need for a Whiteheadian ontology that could draw lessons from chemistry and that would hold for 
all of the sciences. This paper will follow Bachelard's proposal only to a very limited extent and 
take the notion of "metachemistry" in a different direction. Where Bachelard considered chemistry a 
pure science in its own right and generalized from a specific state of its development, 
“metachemistry” is in the following thought to provide general insights from an understanding of 
chemistry as an impure technoscience. The difference between metaphysics and metachemistry 
therefore signifies a shift in the kinds of questions one asks about the sciences and the 
technosciences and the kinds of answers one might expect. In respect to chemistry, this would 
amount to abandoning the question about the specific character of chemistry as opposed to physics. 
Instead of chemistry aspiring to hold its own in the pantheon of the sciences, the notion of 
metachemistry refers to chemistry as a technology for bringing forth new things. In respect to the 
implicit presuppositions of knowledge production, metaphysics refers to the conditions that allow 
for the scientific representation of facts while metachemistry to the conditions for the 
technoscientific realization of things. Arguably, Lavoisier's dictum that "there is nothing new in art 
and nature" is a precondition for scientific explanation and representation, but the alchemical 
tradition in all of chemistry and now, for example, in nanotechnology subverts this dictum 
permanently.  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META-QUESTIONS 
Though it is hardly known or used at all, lacks a common definition, and sounds like a pun, the 
word “metachemistry” is no stranger than its well-established counterpart “metaphysics.”  Indeed, 1
as soon as one begins to clarify the meaning or use of “metaphysics,” the need for something like 
metachemistry becomes readily apparent. 
Metaphysics has nothing much to do with physics in a narrow, disciplinary sense, but it has 
everything to do with knowledge of the physical world, and thus with a kind of science of which 
physics is often taken to be the prime exemplar. If knowledge of the physical world consists in 
holding true beliefs about this world, metaphysics asks what the world must be like such that there 
can be knowledge of it. In the language of Kant, metaphysics concerns the conditions for the very 
possibility of an agreement between a representation and what it represents.  Accordingly, 2
metaphysics has considered the notion of substance and those features of the world that persist 
through time – we can have knowledge about things if the world is such that at least some  facts 
about it persist through time, otherwise we would have fleeting impressions only, but no beliefs that 
are true today and remain true. For that reason, metaphysics has also been concerned with the causal 
law or assumption of causality. If things happened spontaneously and without cause, we could not 
discern relations between events that are subject to representation. And thus metaphysics can be 
said to explore the many aspects of the “aboutness”-relation between knowledge claims and the 
world. And this relation, or so it is thought,  absorbs much of epistemology and all of scientific 
knowledge: For theories, hypotheses, and other propositions to be true, they have to say something 
about something in such a way that there can be a lasting, non-accidental agreement between theory 
and reality, mind and world, the proposition and what it represents. All this may seem to be so 
obvious that it hardly requires stating – and with it comes the sense that metaphysics is an utterly 
familiar enterprise, no matter how confusing one may find it or worthy of critique. 
While it may hold for physics that it seeks knowledge about the world and produces a theoretical 
representation of reality, this does not hold or holds only partly for chemistry. At the very least, 
chemistry serves as an example that the production of knowledge does not issue in theories only or 
even primarily, but that it issues also in compounds, industrial processes, testing routines and 
  An internet search in March 2012 produces a moderate number of hits for “metachemistry” but it is readily apparent that there 1
are mostly incidental uses and no common definition. The more specific search “Bachelard metachemistry” leads to only a small 
number of hits, indicating that Bachelard’s neologism hasn’t caught on.
  As he set out to produce the first of his Critiques, Kant identified in a letter to Marcus Herz the question that “contains the key to 2
the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics.” This question is: “What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we 
call representation to the object?” (Quoted in the introduction by Guyer and Wood to Kant 1997, pp. 47f.). 
!2
laboratory techniques. And instead of using predictions to test the agreement between representation 
and reality, the criterion of knowledge consists, for example, in the ability to move back and forth 
between synthesis and analysis.  So, rather than query the “aboutness”-relation between knowing 3
subject and the world, it might be of equal interest to ask about the productive relation of knowing 
and doing and its conditions of possibility – about “working knowledge,” in other words: 
knowledge that is implicated in what works and that issues in pieces of work.  Here, for example, 4
one might discuss Bachelard’s “realization of the real” (Bachelard 1968, pp. 47f.) or Peirce’s 
“reality as normal product of mental action” (1871, p. 91). Different from idealism or a 
constructivism that is opposed to realism, such explorations would aim to show that the world is 
reliable and robust due to the ways in which human agency is built into works of art, technology, or 
science, and inversely, that the world is built into human work.  Similarly, we might question the 5
fundamental distinction of physis and techné and the many associated distinctions such as the ones 
between organism and artifact, nature and culture, cause and reason. These questions might lead to 
an understanding of powers and affordances, works and worlds that cuts across discovery and 
invention, what is found and what is made. Whereas – despite all their claims to novelty – process 
philosophy, dynamic conceptions of nature, or theories of self-organization merely propose 
alternative ways of properly representing reality, the attempts to articulate the preconditions and 
limits of working knowledge are metachemical.  
This first approach at distinguishing metaphysics and metachemistry is perfectly general. 
Moreover, it might appear that many thinkers have taken steps towards metachemistry, even without 
calling it that.  So far, then, the term “metachemistry” has done little more than suggest that 6
metaphysics revolves around representation, scientific experience, and the possibility of forging and 
  It is worth entertaining as a thought experiment how much would be left of chemistry if it was stripped of words but consisted of 3
routines e.g. to exhibit products in the back and forth between analytic and synthetic procedures. Indeed, quite a lot might be left, but 
whether it is a little or a lot, it would need to be reconstructed metachemically as a productive, non-representational kind of 
knowledge. 
  Baird speaks of “working knowledge” in one chapter of his Thing Knowledge. This is closely related but not identical to the 4
notion I am trying to articulate here, namely one of knowledge that is specifically acquired to make things work and that is exhibited 
and validated by the works (of art, of technology, of science or technoscience) that issue from it (2004, pp. 12, 48 and 66; Baird and 
Nordmann 1994). In search for the right expression I have tried “Fertigkeitswissen” (2011), “knowledge of control” (2012) and often 
refer to knowledge that consists in the acquisition and demonstration of (basic) capabilities (of control), including capabilities of 
manipulation, modeling, visualization. “Working knowledge” may turn out to be the most apt expression.
  The work of Bruno Latour (e.g., 1999) comes to mind here but also that of Martin Heidegger (e.g., 1967) and others.5
  I leave open here whether and where in the philosophical tradition one might find metachemical approaches already. While I am 6
quite sure that process philosophy, theories of dynamic systems, self-organization, or emergence do not offer such an account, it 
might be more promising to look towards phenomenology or pragmatism. Charles Sanders Peirce, for example, compelling considers 
in tandem the production of knowledge and the production of reality, and he considers this not only as a human activity but as one of 
the universe. To read Peirce in this way requires severing his supposed affiliation with Popper and exhibiting his proximity e.g. to 
Latour (Nordmann 2009).  
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securing some kind of agreement between mind and world.  And once one appreciates this limited 7
brief of metaphysics, there is room for the metachemical alternative and the attendant recognition 
that it is far less developed and that, in particular, we have no clear conception of working 
knowledge and thus of a kind of knowledge that is not about something and that is not true or false 
in virtue of how the world is. And if chemistry really does involve the production of such 
knowledge, we can see that the philosophy of chemistry is a place to look for contributions to the 
development of metachemistry.  8
A chemically informed, otherwise programmatically metaphysical philosophy of science has 
contributed to this by way of Gaston Bachelard’s Philosophy of the “Non” which introduced the 
term “metachemistry” (Bachelard 1968, 1981).  On very different grounds than Bachelard’s, the 9
philosophy of chemistry contributes now to the development of metachemistry, paradigmatically 
Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Johnathan Simon’s Chemistry – The Impure Science (2008).  
By looking in the following at Bensaude-Vincent and Simon’s work first, one can see how it 
accords with the general characterization of metachemistry. And from this point of view, one can 
also see how this metachemical project picks up on Bachelard’s conception and where it differs 
from it. This reframing of Bachelard’s original project will bring to light that the different questions 
of metaphysics and metachemistry arise not from the disciplinary juxtaposition of physics and 
chemistry. Instead, they arise from the juxtaposition of physics as a science and chemistry as a 
technoscience – where technoscience is nothing more or less than research that does not produce 
knowledge about the world but produces working knowledge. Negatively defined, technoscience is 
impure in that it abandons the work of separating representations from what they represent, of 
separation the work of technology or culture from the work of science or nature. Positively defined, 
technoscientific research takes place in a technological setting and in a technological manner in that 
it develops and achieves basic capabilities for controlling processes and phenomena, even where 
  To be sure, metaphysics does not imply a commitment to “representationalism“ and to the idea that knowledge consists in the 7
making of pictures. But the discussion of representationalism and its limits, and the many proposals of how to ground the possibility 
of agreement between mind and world in something other than likeness, all concern metaphysics. Likewise, metaphysical questions 
of “grounding the possibility of agreement between mind and world” do not imply a commitment to realism but might lead to 
idealist, positivist, or processualist positions, some of which will “anti-metaphysically” reject the metaphor of “grounding” and 
replace it with more positivist or empiricist accounts. These are the familiar debates in the tradition of metaphysics, broadly 
construed, yet limited to an interest in what the world must be like or how it must be conceived so that it can be known by the mind 
in the form of propositions and theories.
  Again, the philosophy of chemistry cannot possibly be canvassed here. Papers like Newman 1989, Schummer 2003, or Bernal 8
and Daza 2010 come to mind, and of course, the work to be discussed further along in this paper. 
  The title of Bachelard’s book was translated Philosophy of No but this is misleading in that Bachelard refers to non-Aristotelian 9
logic, non-Euclidean geometry, or non-Lavoisian chemistry – where the “non” signifies not outright negation but a next stage in the 
development of science, namely a stage that in Hegelian fashion sublimates (overcomes and includes) the previous stages. 
Accordingly, Bachelard speaks of non-Lavoisian chemistry as “dialectizing” and differentiating the conception of substance in 
Lavoisian chemistry (1981, 59). 
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that control might consist in the ability to exhibit surprising things – and thus, technoscience is 
defined as the kind of research that requires not metaphysics but metachemistry.  So, while at first 10
it might appear to be a subtle point that metaphysics and metachemistry do not owe to the 
difference between physics and chemisty but to the difference between physics as science and 
chemistry as technoscience, this point involves quite a lot – in particular, a genuine appreciation of 
impurity and of chemistry as an impure (techno)science.  11
PURE AND IMPURE 
Metaphysics is all about purity, and from a metaphysical point of view the apparent impurity of 
chemistry is a blemish that needs to be cleared up. This concern with purity comes with the turf if 
one wants to account for the aboutness-relation: In order to understand how a representation can 
agree with what it represents or how a proposition is true of some state of affairs, things need to be 
held apart before they can be related to one another. Since scientific vocabularies and technical 
procedures usually define the objects of study, one needs to determine as precisely as possible what 
concepts, representational devices and experimental techniques do, and at what point they are 
confronted with mind-independent features of the world – features that can warrant agreement of 
theory and reality. Especially with the tradition of Kantianism, a lot of effort has gone into 
specifications of empirical content, such efforts have established an ideal of pure science which has 
proven enormously influential even though it is continuously under threat of being exposed or 
debunked.  For the most part the philosophy of chemistry has inherited this metaphysical brief 12
when it seeks to define a specifically, purely chemical manner of representing specifically, purely 
chemical objects or processes. This concern for the disciplinary identity of chemistry aims to 
remove the blemish of impurity especially in regard to physics and the notion that the better part of 
chemistry is physics and the rest a kind of ill-understood, application-oriented craft.  Indeed, much 13
of the philosophy of chemistry is informed by the suspicion that chemistry as we see it today is not 
real chemistry but a kind of physics. And even those who think that today’s chemistry is real 
  For this definition of technoscience and its precursors see Bensaude-Vincent et al. 2011 and her paper within this volume.10
  Indeed, the point can be pushed further by taking the case back to physics: The different questions of metaphysics and 11
metachemistry arise from the juxtaposition of physics as a science and physics as a technoscience – as soon as one begins to 
appreciate the impurity of physics as craft or technology.
  We owe to Michael Friedman the recognition of the pervasiveness of the Kantian tradition in canonical philosophy of science 12
(e.g., Friedman 2001).
  The remainder of this and the following two paragraphs are incorporated from a review of Bensaude-Vincent and Simon’s book 13
in Nordmann 2010.
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chemistry are prone to query what aspects of contemporary chemical research are beholden to 
physics, where chemistry becomes chemical, and how it is that chemistry is by no means inferior to 
physics. Rather than take their problems from the discipline as they find it, they therefore tend to 
remind chemists of who they are or who they ought to be.  In particular, many philosophers of 
chemistry shift attention from immutable physical processes at the atomic and molecular levels to 
chemistry as an art of transmutation, that is, of changing one kind of physical stuff into another. 
Accordingly, philosophers of chemistry often contradict the ‘‘official’’ story of modern chemistry’s 
separation from alchemy as a feat that was accomplished for good by its founding father Lavoisier. 
Instead, they tend to take seriously the alchemical origins of chemistry and carefully account for the 
vestiges of alchemical thinking. 
In Chemistry: The Impure Science Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Jonathan Simon depart 
from this tradition in the philosophy of chemistry by offering a far more radical proposal. They 
want to save chemistry not from physics but from metaphysics, that is, from the concern to establish 
the peculiar dignity and purity of chemistry. Rather than establish its disciplinary identity in the 
concert of scientific disciplines, Bensaude-Vincent and Simon treat chemistry as an eclectic 
ensemble of ideas and practices. If it is defined at all, this impure science is defined by its 
technoscientific ambitions which provide a common bond that extends from alchemy all the way to 
nanotechnology.  Instead of beginning with chemical substance, with elements and compounds, 14
with analysis and synthesis, with reaction, process, and complexity, the book therefore begins right 
in the middle with DDT and Bakelite, with impurities that include environmental pollution and the 
transgression of traditional divisions between nature and artifact, science and technology. And yet, 
its argument for chemistry as an impure science does not rely on fashionable notions of hybridity. 
What puts chemists in the midst of things is their predicament of being ‘‘condemned to stumbling 
their way through the darkness, trapped at the level of phenomena and never  having  access  to  the 
underlying  substantial  reality,  knowing  only  the outcomes and not the reasons’’ (2008, 62). This 
predicament, however, is not to the detriment of chemistry. Whether at the phenomenological level 
of observing chemical reactions or at an analytic level of instrumentally engaging with molecular 
structure, chemists always encounter matter in its material aspects, that is, superficially. Their 
different ways of experiencing and dealing with chemical matter treat atoms, molecules, and 
macroscopic samples on the same plane ontologically — there is not one reality behind the other, 
there is nothing underlying or hidden or true beneath the phenomenological, superficial, or illusory 
  Perhaps, the final punchline of this book can be put as follows: Nanotechnology shows that chemistry never ceased to be 14
alchemy.
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(2008, 145, 204). Accordingly, the standard metaphysical question of positivism versus realism fails 
to gain traction (2008, 199): On the one hand, chemists claim a positivistic attitude that sticks to 
sense data and does not infer a true reality behind the appearances, on the other hand they work 
with valences and bonds, with atoms and molecules in a manner that takes these to be 
unquestionably real. Similarly, the metaphysical question of reductionism is not germane to 
chemistry. The question presupposes that the levels between which chemists move with great 
facility can be held apart and queried for their relations. It thereby presupposes also that chemistry 
and physics can be considered as distinct even while chemistry appropriates so much of physics. 
One might now be tempted to consider what Bensaude-Vincent and Simon call the chemists’ 
‘‘operational realism’’ as a metaphysical stance of its own which involves a theory of matter that 
defies classical categories. But again, they insist that this is not an alternative metaphysics (2008, 
143–145), in part because chemists are not sufficiently interested in clarity and distinctness, and do 
not hold consistency to be a very high value (2008, 3). For example, the problem of the mixt has 
never been resolved or displaced by the notion of a compound, corpuscularism still haunts atomism, 
elements coexist with principles, and the periodic table remains both a practical tool-box and a 
foundational system (2008, 124–126, 135–138, 160, 170–172). Chemistry’s challenge to philosophy 
is therefore not that it requires better rational reconstructions of its implicit metaphysics so as to 
hold it distinct from physics and biology. Rather, the challenge is to appreciate that the elements of 
the periodic table are analytic objects for conceptual manipulation and at the same time empirical 
objects for material manipulation (2008, 192). Or, to put it differently, the challenge is to see that 
even without a theory of matter, chemists develop notions of matter that allow them to interpret 
reality (2008, 145) – that they do theoretical work even as they eschew consistency and do not refer 
appearances to true underlying realities. From the midst of the mixt, so to speak, Bensaude-Vincent 
and Simon call for a philosophy of science that abandons its interest in purifying the impure science 
of chemistry by using metaphysics as an instrument for the clarification of principles, concepts, and 
commitments. 
To be sure, the rejection of the metaphysical brief is not enough. In the end, an account is needed 
of just how chemists do theoretical work without applying theories, and how they can interpret 
reality through conceptions of matter that are implicit in their practice and do not amount to 
representations of what matter, or of what chemical reality is. Here Bensaude-Vincent and Simon’s 
account is tantalizing sketchy and merely suggestive. And here, it is fruitful to look back at Gaston 
Bachelard’s Philosophy of the Non.  
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BACHELARD’S METACHEMISTRY 
Bensaude-Vincent and Simon refuse to consider chemistry metaphysically and take seriously its 
character as an impure science or technoscience. From their point of view, the impurity of 
chemistry, its ontological indifference (Galison 2006, also Daston and Galison 2007, p. 393, 414) 
and lack of concern with the structure of reality is an asset and not a blemish. It underwrites 
chemistry’s productivity of compounds, materials, procedures, techniques, and models. 
Metaphysical questions of realism versus constructivism do not gain traction and can neither 
impeach nor underwrite chemical knowledge. But for all these evidences of their metachemical 
orientation,  Bensaude-Vincent and Simon do not invoke “metachemistry” to designate their 15
project. Indeed, they explicitly deny that they are continuing “Bachelard’s project of constructing a 
metachemistry as the chemical counterpart to metaphysics” (Bensaude-Vincent and Simon 2010, 
382). The reason for this is obvious enough. In contrast to metachemistry as introduced quite 
generally above, Bachelard proposes the term in order to articulate the significance of an emerging 
new science that creates in its wake also a new philosophy (1984, 3).  He pursues a “presentiment of 
a profound revolution in chemical philosophy,” and as part of this imminent revolution, 
“metachemistry would already seem to be a possibility” (1981, 53). Through a succession of 
epistemic breaks, each saying “no” to a conception of substance that came before it, contemporary 
mid-20th century chemistry finally allows for a metachemical conception of substance. And thus, 
Bachelard’s “metachemistry” marks a clean break with the past and serves in his historical 
reconstruction to purify one notion of substance, and one idea of chemistry in contradistinction to 
others. Quite evidently, this entire program and philosophy of scientific history is caught up in a 
metaphysical concern with successive modes of representation, and it runs counter to Bensaude-
Vincent and Simon’s conception of chemistry as an impure technoscience that represents a tradition 
of practice that ranges at least from alchemy to nanotechnology.  And thus, when Bachelard writes 16
that “[m]etachemistry would be to metaphysics in the same relation as chemistry to physics” (1968, 
  More evidences could be added, especially as they describe physics as adhering to a deductivist project of representation, 15
whereas chemistry is viewed technoscientifically not as providing a picture of reality or theoretical understanding, but as a manner of 
working with materials and other tools to produce new materials.  
  “This leads us to reject the quest for metachemistry and instead to pose the question: to what extent can our epistemological, 16
ontological and anthropological characterization of chemistry be extended to the entire realm of contemporary practices in the natural 
sciences?” Bensaude-Vincent and Simon identify another pertinent limitation of Bachelard’s thinking: “By emphasizing the 
technological component of chemistry, he promoted this science as a model for a new philosophy of science, a rational materialism 
based on phenomenotechnics. However, the technological dimension of science in Bachelard’s works is confined to his views of an 
instrument as a ‘reified theorem’ and chemical synthesis as the concrete expression of a human project” (2010, 382). – As opposed to 
Bensaude-Vincent and Simon, Bachelard wants to strictly distinguish chemistry from alchemy even though, arguably, his notion of 
the „realization of the real“ applies equally well to chemistry and to alchemical routines of purifying and transmuting material stuff 
as well as the souls of the alchemists. 
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45; 1981, 53), he operates, despite himself, with a metaphysical conception of chemistry as a 
discipline sui generis, namely a discipline characterized by a distinctive mode of representing its 
objects. 
But even if one agrees with the rejection of Bachelard’s program, his conception of 
metachemistry is still fruitful and was meant by Bachelard to provide insight beyond a particular 
epoch in the history of science. Like many dialectical thinkers and also like contemporary 
philosophers of technoscience, he explores a contemporary state of development only to discover 
that it serves to describe all of history.  The metachemical conception of substance, in particular, 17
allows one to conceive the entire succession of conceptions of substance as a trajectory that, in 
effect, dissolves the very notion of substance as something persistent that might serve as an object 
of representation. The ultimate substance of ‘substance’ is its own history of rationalizations and 
conceptualizations and their associated practices (1968, 44, 72f., 76). 
Metaphysics could have only one possible notion of substance because the elementary 
conception of physical phenomena was content to study a geometrical solid characterized by 
general properties. Metachemistry will benefit by the chemical knowledge of various 
substantial activities. It will also benefit by the fact that true chemical substances are the 
products of technique rather than bodies found in reality. This is as much as to show that the 
real in chemistry is a realization. (1968, 45) 
When Bachelard speaks of “[c]hemical knowledge of various substantial activities” this conception 
includes the above-mentioned working knowledge of techniques which can participate in material 
agencies so as to afford substances as works of chemistry. That the real is a realization (rather than, 
say, a discovery or a construction) appears to be a general point about the technosciences which do 
not seek primarily to represent and understand the world but which, impurely, combine various 
productive agencies. Here, Bachelard’s notion of metachemistry agrees with the general meaning 
assigned to it above. Substance conceived metaphysically refers to the persistence or obduracy of 
features of a mind-independent reality – it is a subject of representation only if the propositions 
about those features say something that is not already known. This ‘substance’ is introduced as an 
unknown, at least as yet unknown nature of things which persists so that we can gain knowledge of 
it., “[F]or a chemist who has just realized a synthesis, chemical substance must, on the contrary, be 
equated with what one knows about it” (1968, 47) and, in particular, what is known in the process 
  Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, or Andrew Pickering discovered technoscience as a contemporary hybrid of science and 17
technology (“these can no longer be distinguished”) and went on to say that there was never a pure science anyhow, and that all 
previous attempts to juxtapose science and technology were ideological (“there was never a proper distinction”). This universalizing 
move has been criticized by Rabinow 1997. – Along similar lines, Bachelard can be found claiming Mendeleef’s tables as the 
birthplace of metachemistry (1981, 58). 
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of making. If chemical substance is thus tied to knowledge, it is not a definite something or mere 
substrate that endures through time. Instead, it is at all times fully realized as just what it appears to 
be, and at the same time it never stays the same as it becomes transformed in processes of making, 
remaking, and learning to make. As an indefinite “something out there” – like a material probe for 
chemical analysis or an apparent disorder presented at a clinic – the substance enters into a series of 
interactions that produce determinate things that are characterized by their performance, 
functionality, or affordances. That substance is always no more and no less than what we know 
about the techniques of exhibiting it, underwrites Bachelard’s curiously rationalistic story of 
successive epistemic breaks but agrees also with Bensaude-Vincent and Simon’s picture of 
chemistry as treating all modes of chemical experience on the same plane.  
Bachelard describes the trajectory of successive states of knowledge or competence in terms that 
were later echoed by Bruno Latour (Nordmann 2006). This trajectory becomes visible “when one of 
the variables included in the representation is time and the other variable corresponds to some 
characteristic of substance” (1968, 64). In this kind of graph, Bachelard suggests, one can plot the 
definition or institution of substance. The choice of variables avoids the metaphysical 
presupposition that there is a stable “it” that is being represented with ever greater accuracy: the 
probe and the disorder are perfectly well-known and can be described in great detail before 
chemical composition is revealed or a specific disease defined. The apparent constancy of this “it” 
emerges only from a continuity of interaction and its narrative order – it is the story of interactions 
that build upon one another and accrue competences or knowledge to produce behavioral 
performances that fix a common referent that has always been there (Latour 1996, Latour 1999, pp. 
145-173). In the context of this storyline, substances result from the accumulation of more and more 
characteristics: They appear to become more articulate and better articulated as they incorporate 
“more and more of the conditions needed to detect them” (1968, 59). Considered along the 
continuous path of this trajectory, substances become increasingly reliable or stable actors in 
experimental and technological interactions, that is, as the situations are defined and become 
defined in which they will assert themselves in certain ways. The trajectory is therefore graphed in 
reference to two variables: The time that passes as the collective work of science goes on, and a 
scale that registers the accumulation of characteristics with which the substance becomes identified. 
50 years later, the graph envisioned by Bachelard was actually produced by Bruno Latour with 
respect to Pasteur’s experiments and the “discovery” of Tasmania (1990).  18
  To be sure, the graph that here appears to be co-produced by Bachelard and Latour brings out a tension in Bachelard’s account: 18
The graph highlights the continuity of a process through which some “it“ becomes ever more definite and through which the real is 
determined, that is, the continuous accumulation of characteristics (this continuity also accords with Peirce’s philosophy). Bachelard, 
of course, is also likely to point out the discontinuity of epistemic breaks – and he is thereby closer to Bensaude-Vincent and Simon’s 
account which implicitly rejects the teleology of a continuous trajectory of realization. 
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Despite its curiously Hegelian notion of an advancement of thinking about substance that has 
reached a particular stage during the first half of the 20th century, Bachelard’s historicist and 
technological understanding of substance as substance-in-the-making thus meets up with the 
perfectly general account of Bruno Latour. Accordingly, Bachelard’s idiosyncratic notion of 
metachemistry offers one avenue towards making more precise the general and vague conception at 
the opening of this chapter.   
WORKING KNOWLEDGE 
On the basis of these rather principled and conceptual considerations, we can finally turn to 
technoscientific practices that call for metachemical reconstructions. For each of these practices one 
should ask what specific relation they forge between knowing and making. So far, chemistry came 
in through the work of Bensaude-Vincent and Simon as a prominent exemplar of an impure 
technoscience. Also, chemistry came into play with Bachelard’s contrast of physical or 
metaphysical substance (a geometrical solid characterized by general properties) and chemical or 
metachemical substance (the material stuff that enters the laboratory and through constant 
reworking becomes a product that affords particular interactions). When we here go on to cite 
examples of technoscientific practice that call for metachemical reconstructions, chemistry appears 
as before now and there – prominent but by no means privileged. 
Of the following examples of technoscientific method, the one that is most intimately tied to the 
relation of knowing and making is the demand that chemical analysis needs to be matched by 
synthesis.  This demand, in turn, is emblematic of the entire tradition of Baconian science (Smith 
2004, 239) and it has just recently attracted attention in the field of Synthetic Biology with its 
frequent invocation of Richard Feynman’s dictum “What I cannot create, I do not understand” 
which seems closely related at first sight to “what I cannot synthesize, I have not analyzed.” In all 
likelihood, however, this dictum takes on a different meaning when it moves from the blackboard of 
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a physicist who is committed to a scientific ideal of theoretical understanding to a research 
community that prizes making and building.  It needs to be appreciated in respect to the 
metaphysical conceptions that can underwrite agreement theory and reality and in respect to the 
metachemical conceptions that can underwrite the participation of human agency in material 
agency. In particular, does Feynman’s dictum provide a necessary condition for understanding, for 
successful and complete analysis – where the ability to create or synthesize is conclusive evidence 
that validates a theory or proposed analysis? On this interpretation, understanding is intellectual and 
consists in a representation or mental model of a phenomenon, and the ability to create confirms the 
mental model. While this is probably what Feynman meant to say, at least some proponents of 
Synthetic Biology take his statement as providing a sufficient condition “what I create, I thereby 
also understand” (again, see Benner and Sismour 2005). This reading is unintelligible and must be 
rejected as long as understanding is tied to the aboutness-relation and as long as it concerns the 
relation of mind and world. On a metachemical reconstruction it might become intelligible – if, for 
example, the ability to create is taken as a form of successful participation in the world, a sign of 
having achieved a feeling for the behavior of a physical system.  19
If the realization of the real involves participation in the real, the separation of mind and world as 
separate spheres is no longer possible – and with that, there is also no separation between the 
superficiality of mere appearances and the depth of explanatory structures behind the appearances. 
And thus, we are back in the midst Bensaude-Vincent and Simon’s account and in the midst of the 
impure where metaphysical debates about foundationalism, reductionism, positivism vs. realism do 
not gain traction. This holds also for questions of compositionality – is water made up of the two 
components hydrogen and oxygen, or is there salt in the sea?  As before, this question requires 20
different treatment in the context of seeking to know the world representationally by way of true 
propositions, and in the context of knowing the world technologically in the course of acquiring 
capabilities of control. That the whole might be more than the sum of its parts and similar notions 
are necessary metaphysical devices to represent systems and a special class of properties that are 
now called emergent. At the same time, mereological notions of components and systems can be 
considered grammars of chemical practice that regulate the movement of researchers between atoms 
and elements, molecules and bulk matter, and the devices that address and interact with them. 
   Feynman’s statement has also been understood as a modern formulation of Giambattista Vico’s verum factum principle which 19
places a limit on the ability to understand nature as something that humans have not created and therefore will never properly 
understand (Schummer 2011, 136-147).
  The following remarks are inspired but do not begin to do justice to Harré and Llored (2011).20
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Molecules do not “emerge” from atoms, and certainly they do not “self-organize.” Instead a certain 
organization of technical attention, one that includes mereological conceptions but also laboratory 
apparatus and physical samples, affords molecules or affords atoms or even affords commonplace 
bulk matter: “There is no sodium in salt, but salt affords sodium” (Harré and Llored, 2011, 70). 
Mereology (and similarly, causality) as a grammar for interaction with the world is always 
implicated in the relation of making and knowing. When technoscientists in their laboratory show 
that this process yields that outcome or that they can reliably produce a surprising effect or that in 
this probe they can isolate that trace element, these capabilities involve par excellence an implicit or 
explicit conception of parts and wholes, constituents and components, structures and functions, of 
bits as distinct from parts, of fusions as distinct from sums. A similar point can be made in regard to 
causality: implicit knowledge of what kinds of actions are necessary and jointly sufficient to 
produce a certain kind of effect involves a conception of the ways in which the work of people upon 
material stuff is productive and affords works of art, of engineering, or of technoscience. 
To be sure, a lot of further detail is required here: Technoscientific working knowledge 
participates in the world by way of producing works that afford activities and things (Harré  2003). 
This sets it apart from a magical mode of participation that seeks to change the world through the 
manipulation of signs. A voodoo doll that is in some ways similar to a human being if only, say, by 
sharing a lock of hair with that person, does not represent or symbolize her. Instead, it is an icon 
which shares in the reality of that person such that actions on the doll are simultaneously actions 
towards that person.  In contrast, working knowledge participates in the world through the 
technological creation of works, as, for example, in alchemy, chemistry, and nanotechnology. Here 
too, this involves the creation of iconic devices that share in the reality of something else. One such 
device would be a so-called CAVE-environment that allows researchers to interact “face to face” 
with molecules, which includes not only to see but even to feel molecules as molecules “see” or 
“feel” each other. This is accomplished by entering a cave-like three-dimensional simulation model 
and by experimentally intervening in a scaled-up molecular world by pushing and pulling and thus 
experiencing binding forces first-hand in this substitute environment. Since the CAVE has many 
features of reality packed into it (not unlike that lock of hair), action performed in its environments 
are thought to be actions on the “real” physical entities (which is how one can speak of simulation 
experiments).  And as in pre-modern magical thinking (Foucault  1973), the mere likeness or 21
similarity of two things suffices to infer a common cause – since an experimentally obtained and a 
  This point can be extended to many simulation models, animal models, and generally „models for“ in contrast to „models 21
of“ (Fox Keller 2000).
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calculated image look alike, one infers that they owe to the same causal dynamic, even if this 
dynamic is implemented in the computer in one case and an experimental system, in the other case. 
That the similarity of things should testify to their participation in a shared reality and that this 
should underwrite causal inferences is difficult, if not impossible to reconstruct with classical 
epistemology which seeks to avoid circularity by ensuring that evidence is independent from and 
external to theories and their models. As opposed to voodoo, however, causal inferences from a 
CAVE environment or from a genetically engineered animal model for a human disease are by no 
means unfounded. They are underwritten by the technical construction of the substitute reality and 
all the theoretical as well as working knowledge that goes into it (Reinhardt 2006). 
To conclude this cursory list of research practices that call for a metachemical conception of 
knowing and making in the world, here is an immersive routine of working knowledge that 
produces participation in a system through a process of taking on ever more features of the world 
such that it can finally serve as a substitute for it. This is the routine that Hasok Chang has identified 
for the construction of measuring instruments and that is now being explicitly transferred from 
software engineering to the construction of synthetic organisms (Chang 2004, O’Malley 2009).  22
The iterative loop looks simple enough. It begins with an analysis that is used to construct a model 
that then exhibits some behavior. Here the second cycle begins with an analysis of the behavior of 
the model that informs the correction of the model that then exhibits a somewhat different behavior. 
And thus commences a process of tuning a model to exhibit a desired behavior which is similar, 
perhaps, to a complex behavioral pattern that is observed in the “real” world. By incorporating more 
and more knowledge of that world into the corrections of the model, the model gains in complexity 
and participates ever more deeply in the workings of the world.  This iterative process thus began 23
with an aboutness-relation and a classic notion of representation but moved on to produce a 
working knowledge that has become reliable due to a process of assimilation:  The researchers 
began with an analysis of a process or phenomenon, event or situation that led to the construction of 
an initial model that represented the situation in question. But with each subsequent iteration they 
absorb more and more of the world into the model – they no longer analyze the situation in order to 
speak about the world, but they analyze the behavior of the model in order to imitate the world. The 
researchers thus gain a feeling for the behavior of the complex system that is growing up under their 
  Chang takes Peirce’s epistemology of self-correction as a model for this process of iteration. But rather than tending to the limit 22
of a frequency, the iterative self-corrections of measuring devices resemble the technological model from software engineering. 
  This is an instance also of what Andrew Pickering calls the mangle of practice (1995) – attempting  to differentiate and specify 23
what is glossed over and lumped together by the notion of the “mangle.” 
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hands, and they lose analytic or theoretical understanding in the form of intellectually tractable 
claims about the world (cf. Lenhard 2011). Their realization of the real follows a metachemical 
trajectory: they gradually incorporate more and more of the world into their works and thereby learn 
to know it. And thus, if metaphysics is concerned with what the world must be like in order to 
support aboutness-relations, the task of metachemistry is to explore how the working knowledge of 
researchers affords works of technoscience that share in the same reality as the works of nature, and 
moreover, to explore the significance of the participation of works in the world and of the world in 
the work of technoscience  
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